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WASHINGTON

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME VI.

FEBRUARY, 1931

NUMBER 1

A REVIEW OF COMMON CARRIER MOTOR VEHICLE
REGULATION
Perhaps no other single factor has played so great a part in the
revolution of the economic and social life of the nation during the
past generation as the motor vehicle. With the growth of its importance in transportation has come the necessity for regulation.
Broadly speaking, outside of the matter of general registration, the
regulation, or necessity for regulation, falls within three periods.
corresponding with the improvement of the motor vehicle itself and
with the development of the highways (1) the intracity or "jitney
bus" period, (2) the intrastate period, and (3) the interstate
period. The regulation of the first two classes has proceeded rather
uniformly and along fairly well defined lines. The regulation of
the third class, however, is still in a chaotic condition.
The first monumental landmark in the field of motor vehicle
regulation is the case of Hendrick v. Maryland.- On July 1, 1910,
John T. Hendrick, resident and commorant in the District of Columbia, left his office in Washington m his own automobile and
drove into Prince Georges County, Maryland. While temporarily
there he was arrested on the charge of operating it upon the highway
without having complied with the requirements of the Maryland
motor vehicle law, which went into effect on that date. The law
required both a car license and an operator's permit. Hendrick
wasotried before a justice of the peace, found guilty, and fined
$15.00. From the Circuit Court of Prince Georges County the case
was carried to the United States Supreme Court on writ of error.
In affirming the conviction, Mr. Justice McReynolds, delivering the
opinion of the court, stated
"In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations
235 U. S. 610, 59 L. Ed. 385, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (1914).
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necessary for the public safety and order in respect to the
operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles,-those
moving in interstate commerce as well as others." 2
Another rule laid down was this
"
where a state at its own expense furnishes special
facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may exact compensation therefor. The amount of the charges and the method of collection are primarily for determination by the state itself,
and so long as they are reasonable and are fixed according
to some uniform, fair, and practical standard, they consti1)3
tute no burden on interstate commerce

With this decision as a starting point, it is interesting to note the
growth and the trend of motor vehicle regulation, both judicial and
legislative.
JITNEY

Bus

REGULATION

In 1915 the legislature of Washington passed an act to take effect
April 10, 1915, making it unlawful to transport or carry pasesngers
for hire in cities of the first class without a permit from the Secretary of State.4 For each motor vehicle intended to be operated the
applicant was required to deposit and keep on file with the Secretary of State a surety company bond in the penal sum of $2,500
conditioned for the faithful compliance with the provisions of the
act and to pay all damages which might be sustained by reason
of any careless, negligent or unlawful act of the principal, his
agents, etc. It further provided for the payment of a fee of $5
to the Secretary of State.
In State v. Howell5 a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary
of State to submit the statute to referendum was denied on the
ground that there had been no abuse of legislative discretion in
stating that an emergency existed, and that "the reasonable reguIbid. 622.

The statement continues as follows:

"And to this end it

may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their
drivers, charging therefor reasonable fees graduated according to the horsepower of the engines-a practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of
control. This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized
as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health,
safety, and comfort of their citizens; and it does not constitute a direct and
material burden on interstate commerce. The reasonableness of the state's
action is always subject to inquiry in so far as it affects interstate commerce, and in that regard it is likewise subordinate to the will of Congress
(citing cases)
"
Ibid. 623-624.
Transportation by Motor Vehicles, Chap. 111, Session Laws 1921.
'85 Wash. 294, 147 Pac. 1159 (1915).
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lation of common carriers by legislation has always been recogized
as a proper exercise of the police power touching the safety and
the welfare of the public."0 The court, however, did not pass upon
the validity of the act.
In State v. Seattle Tax?.ab & Transfer Co.7 the act" came squarely
before the court on its merits. The Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co.
refused to comply with the provisions of the act on the ground that
it was in contravention of the federal and state constitutions. The
company was found guilty by the trial court and sentenced to pay
the fine provided by the act for non-compliance.
The company contended that the statute violated Section 12,
Article 1, of the Constitution of the -State of Washington, which
prohibits the legislature from passing laws granting to one citizen
or class of citizens privileges and immunities which are not granted
to all alike, and hence was discriminatory, as it denied it the equal
protection of the laws.9 The basis of this contention was that street
car companies were not required to file bonds while motor carriers
were. The court pointed out the heavy investment in fixed property winch street car companies were required to make as compared
to the small investment in mobile property required to operate a
jitney bus and then stated.
cc
it is plain that the one from the necessities of the
case must have a visible fund from which persons negligently injured by its operation may recoup ins losses, while
the other need not have such a fund, and tins difference
we think justifies legislation requiring a bond of indemnity
from the one not required of the other.' ' 10
Another contention was that the act was invalid because of the
character of the bond required. The requirement was that it be
obtained from a "good and sufficient surety company licensed to
do business in tins state," making no provision for substitutes in
any form, or for bonds with other sureties of equal responsibility
No evidence was introduced to show that such bonds could not be
procured. The court pointed out numerous other situations in
winch the legislature without question determines the character
6147 Pac. at 1161.
' 90 Wash. 416, 156 Pac. 837 (1916).
' The complete act is set out in the decision.
IA similar contention was made and disposed of in McGlotherm v. City

of Seattle, 116 Wash. 331, 199 Pac. 457 (1921).

10156 Pac. at 840. See also Puget Sound Traction, izght & Power Co. v.
Grassmeyer,102 Wash. 482, 173 Pac. 504, L. R. A. 1918F 469 (1918).
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of surety that may be furnished when surety is required as a prerequisite to the granting of a right. It therefore held this requirement valid. 1
The contention that the act was void because it exempted from
its provisions carriers of the United States mails was dismissed as
2
without merit.'
A further contention that the act deprived the company of its
property without due process of law was dismissed as unsound, the
court citing a number of recent cases in other jurisdictions in
which similar legislation had been upheld.
The Port of Seattle operated a ferry to carry passengers between
the business district of the city of Seattle and a portion of the city
known as West Seattle. The Ferry Line Auto Bus Company was
organized "for the purpose of engaging in the performance of a
certain contract with the Port of Seattle."
The operation of the
bus service was to furnish residents of the west side with transpor
tation to and from the ferry In State v FerryLine Auto Bus Co.' 3
the bus company was held to be subject to the act.
In Allen v. City of Bellingham1 4 it was held that an ordinance of
the City of Bellingham was not unconstitutional as discriminatory
class legislation because it imposed upon jitney busses taxes and
restrictions which it did not impose upon the operators of auto
stages, sight-seeing automobiles, taxicabs, horse stages, street cars,
and other carriers transporting passengers for hire within the
city 15

In Hadfield v. Lundin' 6 one Hadfield had been operating a jitney bus under the act, he having filed the requisite bond with the
Secretary of State. The bond had expired and he could not obtain
another one from an acceptable insurance company
Hadfield,
however, offered to file a policy of liability insurance issued to
him by the Mutual Union Insurance Company in the penal sum of
'1 See

Sprout v. South Bend, infra note 68.
These perform a service sufficiently differentiated from the ordinary carrier of passengers as to form a class by themselves, and legislation
affecting other classes of carriers is not of necessity required to include
them.
" 156 Pac. at 841.
1 93 Wash. 614, 161 Pac. 467 (1916)
The court held that the bus service
was not an integral part of the service conducted by the Port of Seattle, and
furthker "it is not the rule that a municipal corporation can itself engage,
or contract with another to engage, in the business of carrying passengers
for hire in contravention of a public statute forbidding it.
1495 Wash. 12, 163 Pac. 18 (1917)
See, in connection with this case, State v. City of Spokane, 109 Wash.
360, 186 Pac. 864 (1920) concerning right of municipality to regulate or
prohibit jitney bus operation.
1 98 Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516, L. R. A. 1918 B, 909 (1917)
12"
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$2,500 and by its terms assignable to the Secretary of State. Such
however, was not a compliance with the terms of the statute.
Hadfield contended the statute was unconstitutional in that it
deprived him of his liberty and property without due process of law
The court disposed of this contention merely by citing State v.
Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co.' 7 and State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus
C0.18

The court discussed at length the difference between the right of
the citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his property
thereon, in the ordinary course of things, and the use of the public
highways as a place of business. With respect to the latter, it said.
"If any proposition may be said to be established by
authority, the right of the state in the exercise of its police
power to prohibit the use of the streets as a place of private
business, or as the chief instrumentality in conducting
,19
such business, must be held so established
Wilh respect to Hadfield's contention that he should be permitted to file the bond of the Mutual Union Insurance Company20
the court said
9
Appellant does not claim that an arrangement
such as tendered in his complaint would be a compliance
with the law, but argues, in substance, that it is something
We
just as good. But the courts cannot legislate.
are asked not to construe the statute, but to amend it under
the guise of construction. We must decline that office. "21
A review of these early cases shows a sound beginning, both by
the legislature and by the courts, in dealing with the problems of
motor vehicle regulation at first presented.
INTRASTATE REGULATION

In 1921 the legislature of the State of Washington passed the
Transportation by Motor Vehicle Act. 22 The central idea is stated
in Section 4, where it is provided.
17Supra note 7.
8 ,Supranote 13.
10 168 Pac. at 518. See also Schoenfeld v. City of Seattle (D. C.), 265 Fed.
726 (1920).
.-The court had held that the Mutual Union Insurance Company could
not write the bond required by the statute. State ex rel. Mutual Union Ins.
Co. v. Fishback, 97 Wash. 565, 166 Pac. 799 (1917)
21168 P c. at 519.
--Chapter 111, Laws of 1921. Except for the matter of fees, this act
st. ns today as originally passed. See Chapter 108, Laws of 1929.
It was held in State ex rel. Seattle & R. V By. Co. v. Superior Court
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"No auto transportation company shall hereafter operate for the transportation of persons and, or, property for
compensation between fixed termini or over a regular
route 3 in this state, without first having obtained from the
Commission under the provisions of this act a Certificate
declaring that public convenience and necessity2 4 require
such operation, but a Certificate shall be granted when it
appears to the satisfaction of the Commission that such per
son, firm or corporation was actually operating in good
faith, over the route for which such certificate shall be
sought on January 15th, 1921. 2 5 Any right, privilege, cer
tificate held, owned or obtained by an auto transportation
company may be sold, assigned, leased, transferred or inherited as other property, only upon authorization by the
commission. 26 The commission shall have power, after
hearing, when the applicant requests a certificate to oper
ate in a territory already served by a certificate holder
under this act, only when the existing auto transportation
company or companies serving such territory will not provide the same to the satisfaction of the commission, and
in all other cases with or without hearing, to issue said
certificate as prayed for, or for good cause shown to refuse
to issue same, or to issue it for the partial exercise only of
said privilege sought, and may attach to the exercise of
the rights granted by said certificate to such terms and
conditions as, in its judgment, the public convenience and
necessity may require."
For the protection of the public the statute also required the
owner or operator to procure liability and property damage insurance or a surety bond for the same purpose on each motor vehicle
7
operated.1
One of the first cases to arise under the act was In re Sound
for King County, 123 Wash. 116, 212 Pac. 259 (1923) that this act does not
deprive the cities of the right to regulate the use of their streets, nor does
it repeal Chapter 57, Laws of 1915 (see supra note 4)
" In North River Transp. Co. v. Denney, 149 Wash. 489, 271 Pac. 589
(1928) it was held that: "The termini must be fixed, not ambulatory and
the route a regular one, not changeable."
"In North Bend Stage Line v. Denney, 153 Wash. 439, 279 Pac. 752
(1929) the court considered the meaning of the word "necessity" as used
in the statute.
- That operation commenced subsequent to that date gives no preference, see Deppman v. Department of Public Works, 151 Wash. 78, 275 Pac.
70 (1929)
" See Washington Motor Coach Co. v. Baker 291 Pac. 733 - Wash. (1930)
"Section 5. In Packard v. Barton, 264 U. S. 140, 68 L. Ed. 596 (1924)
it was held that a statute requiring operators of motor vehicles for hire,
excepting street cars and omnibusses, to secure insurance for the protection of persons injured by their operation was not unconstitutional as depriving of equal protection of the laws.
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Transit 0.28 Sound Transit Company was operating a motor bus
line between Roosevelt Heights and Seattle, Wash., on and prior
to January 15, 1921. Pursuant to the act an order was entered
and a certificate issued by the Director of Public Works to Sound
Transit Company The certificate recited that it was "subject to
the ordinances of the said city now in effect or which may hereafter
become effective, governing the operation of motor vehicles upon
the streets of said city "9
The contention of the company was that its certificate gave it
power to use the streets of Seattle regardless of the ordinances of
the city To this contention the court replied.
"
The fact that the Sound Transit Company was in
operation prior to January 15, 1921, and was therefore
entitled to a certificate as a matter of right, does not give
it, under any proper construction of law, the right to
operate free from any regulation or control by making
use of the streets of the city without reference to its ordinances and regulations, and without regard to any regulations of the Department of Public Works."8 0

It is thus clear that the act did not take away any power of police
regulation over its streets which a city theretofore had.
In Knowles v. KuykendalZ'l the court held that the Director
of Public Works had the power to revoke a certificate obtained by
means of false and fraudulent representations concerning the applicant's operation in good faith between the localities named on
January 15, 1921.
In the case of State v Price8 2 one Price was convicted of transporting passengers for hire without having obtained from the Public Service Commission a certificate of public conveience and
necessity and without having procured insurance on his automobile,
under Chapter 111, Laws of 1921. The facts were stipulated. Price
had a contract with the United States government to carry mail
between Castle Rock and Toutle, Wash., and in executing his contract used a passenger automobile, with which he made one round
trip daily from Castle Rock to Toutle. He would accept passen".119 Wash. 684, 206 Pac. 931 (1922).
- Section 11 of the act provides: "This act shall not repeal any of the
existing law or laws, relating to motor-propelled vehicles, their owners or
operators, or requiring compliance with any condition for their operation."
'0119 Wash. at 689.
122 Wash. 315, 210 Pac. 666 (1922).
2 122 Wash. 421, 210 Pac. 787 (1922).
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gers and freight for transportation when he had room for them.
Price contended that under these facts he did not come within the
operation of Chapter 111 for two reasons (1) That the law applied
only to common carriers operating between fixed termini, and
(2) that before the act could apply to him the commission would
have to determine, as a question of fact, that the automobile was
being operated between fixed termini as a carrier.
The second contention was purely technical, as there was no
question as to the points between which Price was operating. As to
the first, however, the court said
"The answer to appellant's first contention is that it is
not necessary for the vehicle owner, in order for the act of
1921 to apply to him, that he be a common carrier, as that
term is technically defined. The act provides that all per
sons who transport persons or property for compensation
over any public highway between fixed termini or on a
regular route must have a license, etc., and provides cer
tam exceptions, none of which apply to the appellant.
The facts show that the appellant was carrying passengers
for hire, and also show that he was operating between fixed
termini and on a regular route. The act plainly applies
to all persons conducting such businesses as the appellant 's. ,3
That the conclusion of the court is sound is obvious.
In the case of Carlsen v Cooney 34 defendant Cooney was the proprietor and operator of a storage and transfer business, having his
office and prmnci)al place of business in Tacoma. He did not
operate his trucks between fixed termini, nor over any regular
route. Ile did not have a certificate of necessity under Chapter
111,, Laws of 1921, but he did comply with Chapter 96, Laws of
1921, relating to the licensing of motor vehicles generally Cooney
never at any time operated any of his motor trucks for compensation between fixed termini or over a regular route.
Plaintiff Carlsen was the proprietor and operator of a freight
service bv motor vehicles over the state highways between Tacoma,
Camp Lewis, Dupont, and Cady's Camp, between fixed termini
and over a regular route, under a certificate of necessity duly
issued to hin by the Department of Public Works.
The instant case came into court apparently by reason of Cooney's
33122 Wash. at 422.
31123 Wash. 441, 212 Pac. 575 (1923)
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hauling a large quantity of boots and shoes from Camp Lewis to
Tacoma over a portion of Carlsen's regular route, in pursuance of
a special hauling contract which Cooney had entered into with a
Tacoma mercantile concern which had purchased the boots and
shoes from the United States government. Carlsen commenced
an action seeking an injunction restraining Cooney from hauling
goods for compensation over any part of the regular route covered
by Carlsen's certificate.
Taxicabs are excepted from the operation of the statute. 5 Carlsen
contended that this exception of taxicabs, which are not operated
over regular routes, necessarily excluded exceptions of all vehicles
operated for compensation over the highways, other than those
which are operated between fixed termini or over regular routes.
The court, in effect, admitted that "as a matter of cold logic"
Carlsen's contention was sound, but held that, "viewing the act as
a whole, and having in mind its manifest purpose," 3 6 such a conclusion was not warranted. So judgment for the defendant was
affirmed.
The case of Dams & Banker v. Nickell37 presented the following
situation. Davis & Banker, Inc., had a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate a freight and passenger stage line
between Pateros and Winthrop, in Okanogan county G. E. Nickell
& Sons had a certificate under the same law for transporting freight
only over the same route. Nickell & Sons habitually carried passengers, sometimes soliciting them, but the evidence was that no charge
was ever made. Davis & Banker sought an injunction restraining
Nickell from carrying passengers on the ground that Nickell was
doing this solely to injure their business. The trial court denied
relief, apparently on the ground that as iio charge was made there
was no violation of the Transportation Act. The Supreme Court,
reversing the decision of the lower court, and granting the injunction, said
"There can be no question but that, if respondents were
shown to be collecting fares from the passengers transported, their acts would be an unlawful interference with
the rights of appellant. Puget Sound Tractson, Ight &
Power Co. v. arassmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, 173 Pac. 504,
-Section 1(d), Chapter 111, Laws of 1921.

123 Wash. at 448, 449.
,126 Wash. 421, 218 Pac. 198 (1923). To similar effect are Davis v. Clev-

viger 127 Wash. 136, 219 Pac. 845 (1923)
130 Wash. 511, 228 Pac. 297 (1924).

and Chelan Transfer Co. v. Foote,
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L. R. A. 1918F, 469. But is not the true test, not whether
the unlicensed operator is deriving a profit, but whether
his acts are necessarily a direct injury to the certificate
holder 9 We think so, and we are not without authority
" (citing cases) 38
to sustain this view
The court, however, robbed the decision of some of its force by
saying if Nickell "did nothing more than to offer to and carry
passengers overtaken on the highway, even if habitually done, we
would not interfere." 3 9 Question might arise as to the extent to
which this should be permitted. But the main part of the decision
is clearly sound.
A case illustrating sound judicial interpretation is that of State
ex rel. Great Northern Ry. Co. v Department of Public Works.40
The Department of Public Works granted to one William Bender a
certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing the transportation of freight by motor vehicles between Leavenworth and
Wenatchee in Chelan county on the ground that Bender "was
actually operating in good faith over the route
on January 15,
1921." The Department found that the road was practically impassable throughout the winter months, so that Bender did not
actually operate a truck on January 15, 1921, but that he had
been operating a truck during the seasons of the year when the
condition of the roads permitted. The contention of the Great
Northern was that Bender was not entitled to the certificate as a
matter of right because he was not actually operating on January
15, 1921. The court, however, held that within the meaning of
the statute as a whole Bender was operating in good faith on January 15, 1921.
The case of State v. Department of Public Works4 ' involved both
the effect of priority in filing application for a certificate, and the
weight to be given to the finds of fact made by the Department.
The United Auto Transportation Company had a certificate authorizing it to carry passengers between Camp Lewis and the city
of Tacoma over the Pacific Highway The City Transportation
Company had a certificate authorizing it to carry passengers beiween Tacoma and Steilacoom, including the Western Washington
Hospital for the Insane, using the Steilacoom Highway for the
126
"126
"0127
"129

Wash. at 424
Wash. at 424.
Wash. 121, 219 Pac. 878 (1923)
Wash. 5, 223 Pac. 1048 (1924)
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purpose. Both of these companies filed application for a certificate
to serve the new government reconstruction hospital, winch was to
be located between or beyond the line of either. The City Transportation Company filed its application first.
The Departmenint, taking all things into consideration, including
the fact that the City Transportation Company filed its application
first, came to the conclusion that the public interest would be best
served by granting the certificate to the City Transportation Com42

pany, winch it did.

The court refused to disturb the findings of the department on
the ground that, "after all is said, only a question of fact is involved
here," and "we have held that the findings of the department will
not be disturbed, unless they show evidence of arbitrariness and
disregard of the material rights of the parties to the controversy," 43
and no such arbitrariness was found.44
Where several companies having common terminals at junction
points furnish adequate service and sell through tickets over the
route in question, there is no ground for granting a certificate to a
new applicant desiring to establish a through service over the same
route.

45

Two interesting points were involved in Northern Pac.By. Co. v.
Yaksma-Northern Stages. 4 The stage company had a certificate of
public convenience and necessity authorizing it to operate between
4 Priority of application is not of controlling importance. See Spokane
Northwest Auto Freight v. Department of Public Works, 148 Wash. 61,
268 Pac. 138 (1928).
3129 Wash. at 8. To like effect see Stolting v. Kuykenda l, 131 Wash.
392, 230 Pac. 405 (1924) Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Department of Public
Works, 144 Wash. 47, 256 Pac. 333 (1927) State ex rel. Byram 'V. DepartDeppman -V.
ment of Public Works, 144 Wash. 219, 257 Pac. 634 (1927)
Department of Public Works, 151 Wash. 78, 275 Pac. 70(1929) Auto Interurban Co. v. Department of Public Works, 153 Wash. 479, 279 Pac. 738
North Bend Stage Line v. Denney, 153 Wash. 439, 279 Pac. 752
(1929)
(1929).
See in general with respect to granting or withholding certificate:
Petersburg,Hopewell & City Point Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth of Va. ex Tel.
State Corp. Con., 152 Va. 193, 146 S. E. 292, 67 A. L. R. 931 (1929) and
Chicago Railways Co. v. Commerce Con. ex rel. Chicago Motor Coach Co.,
336 Ill. 51, 167 N. E. 840, 67 A. L. R. 938 (1929), note beginning p. 957.
" In State ex rel. B. & M. Auto Freight v. Department of Public Works,
124 Wash. 234, 219 Pac. 164 (1923), the court had held that priority of
application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity under
Chapter 111, Laws of 1921, did not carry with it the priority of right to the
certificate in the case of two companies both applying for a certificate.
" State ex rel. Krakenberger v. Department of Public Works, 141 Wash.
168, 250 Pac. 1088 (1926). Where both parties are certificate holders see,
however, North Bend Stage Line v. Denney, 153 Wash. 439, 279 Pac. 752
(1929).
"135 Wash. 595, 238 Pac. 905 (1925).
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Yakima and Ellensburg by way of the Wenas Valley road. Later a
new highway between these two points was opened, several miles
from the old one. It was held that the first certificate did not
authorize operation over the new road and that a grant of a certificate by the Department of Public Works, without a finding that the
public convenience and necessity required bus service over the new
47
highway, was invalid.
In Yelton & McLa'ughlin v. Department of Public Works48 appellants had a certificate as of right entitling them to operate from
Bellingham to Glacier. They continued to serve territory east of
Glacier as necessary, but without a certificate. It was held that
under the law giving existing certificate holders preference they
were entitled to a certificate to serve the territory between Glacier
and a resort farther east in the Washington Forest Reserve in preference to the company developing the resort, and paying for part of
the road, but which had not operated a transportation company 49
In State ex rel. United Auto Transp. Co. v. Department of Public
Works ° the court held that a holder of a certificate of convenience
and necessity is entitled to a hearing and an opportunity to make
its service satisfactory before a certificate is granted to another to
operate in the same territory
It has also been held that the department may limit the number
But in Paczfc Northwest Traction Co. v. Departmcnt of Public works.
151 Wash. 659, 276 Pac. 566 (1929) involving a situation in which the old
and the new highways were somewhat nearer together, it was held tha,
the existing carrier over the old highway was entitled to preference in its
application for a certificate to operate over the new highway
Where the purpose of the certificate was primarily to furnish transportation between the terminal points, and the old unpaved road was straightened out and paved, -being at no place more than two and one-half miles
distant from the old road, the holder of a certificate to operate over the old
unpaved highway was entitled to amendment of its certificate authorizing
service over the new highway in preference to other applicants. So held in
North Ccoast TransportationCo. v. Department of Public Works, 57 Wash.
Dec. 16, 288 Pac. 245 (1930)
Where termini are the same, but the territories to be served are distinct
and much of the way separated 20 to 25 miles by a range of high hills or
mountains across which there is little communication, no preference attaches. Spokane Northwest Auto Freight v. Department of Pitblic Works.
148 Wash. 61, 268 Pac. 138 (1928).
1 136 Wash. 445, 240 Pac. 679 (1925)
4 See, however, Demrnan v. Department of Public Works, 57
Wash. Dec.
339, 2S9 Pac. 34 (1930)
50119 Wash. 381, 206 Pac. 21 (1922)
1Whether this preference applies in favor of a rail carrier as against
an applicant for a certificate to furnish motor vehicle transportation in the
same territory seems questionable. See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Departnient of Public Works, 144 Wash. 47, 256 Pac. 333 (1927)
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of certificates to one over a route where there has been shown no
52
necessity for more.
On court review of an order of the Department of Public Works
granting a certificate to one of two parties, it has been held that the
successful party before the Department is a necessary party before
the court.5 3
The question of determining what is a common carrier came before
the court in Independent Truck Co. v. Wright.5 4 Plaintiff was
engaged as a common carrier of freight over the Pacific Highway
between Seattle, Bellingham, and intermediate and neighboring
points, under a certificate of public convenience and necessity Defendants, having no certificate, operated four trucks with trailers
daily between Seattle and Bellingham, maintained depots, issued
bills of lading, kept records of freight carried on each trip, rendered
monthly statements to some of their customers, and maintained
practically uniform rates for various classes of freight carried. They
had 60 or 70 patrons along the line. They openly solicited business.
Plaintiff sought an injunction restraining defendant from operating
over its route, as it claimed, -as a common carrier in direct competition with plaintiff. The lower court granted the injunction,
excepting certain specified shippers from the order.55
The key question in the case was whether defendants were common carriers within the meaning of Section 2 of Chapter 111, Laws
of 1921, as amended by Chapter 166, Laws of 1927 The court
came to the conclusion that they were, stating"
It is impossible to lay down a fixed rule which will
definitely apply in all cases as to just when the transporter
ceases to be a private carrier and becomes a common carrier, but the general principle may easily be comprehended, and where it clearly appears, as in the case at bar,
that the business sought to be enjoined is in all essential
particulars that of a common carrier and that the same is
carried on in unlawful competition with that of a common
carrier acting under a certificate of public convenience
12Arneson v. Denny (D.C.), 25 Fed. (2d) 988 (1928).
Sumner-Tacoma Stage Co. v. Department of Public Works, 142 Wash.
594, 254 Pac. 245 (1927). See State ex rel. Sumner-Tacoma Stage Co. v.
Superior Court for Thurston County, 138 Wash. 376, 244 Pac. 734 (1926)
r' 151 Wash. 372, 275 Pac. 726 (1929). See also State ex rel. Department
of Public Works v. Higgins,155 Wash. 227, 283 Pac. 1074 (1930)
',See, in connection with the exceptions, Spokane Northwest Auto
Freight v. Tedrow, 144 Wash. 481, 258 Pac. 31 (1927).
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and necessity, the further operation of the unlicensed business will be enjoined." 56
The court was careful to state that
"
There should be excepted from the operation of
the decree the casual hauling of freight upon special mdependent contract. Such occasional hauling, if indulged m
Y7
in good faith, is not subject to be restrained.

The history of the problems arising in the state of Washington
is substantially similar to that of the nation as a whole. It is gratifying to note that the record of accomplishment in the field of
intrastate regulation in the state of Washington is one of sound
legislation supported by sound and intelligent judicial decision.
INTERSTATE REGULATION

So far as municipal and state regulation are concerned, the
situation is relatively satisfactory At first there was no particular difficulty respecting the regulation of interstate motor vehicle
transportation, for the reason that the states assumed jurisdiction
and applied the same regulations to interstate carriers that were
applied to those operating intrastate.
The first case involving an interstate motor carrier to come
before the supreme court of Washington was Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Schoenfeldt.8 In this case the railroad company sought an
injunction to restrain the defendant from using the highways of
the state of Washington in interstate commerce without first having a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Department of Public Works, for which the railroad contended there
was no necessity The lower court sustained a demurrer to the
complaint, on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter in issue. On appeal the decision of the lower court
was reversed, with directions to overrule the demurrer, the court
holding that this requirement was not a direct burden on interstate commerce, which it admitted the state had no power to impose, but that it was a valid exercise of the police power by the
state over its highways."
151 Wash. at 379.
57Ibid.

5123 Wash. 579, 213 Pac. 26 (1923).
5 To similar effect see Interstate Motor Transit Co. v. Kuykcendall
(D.C.), 284 Fed. 882 (1922).
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At the same session there came before the court the case of State
v. Department of Public Works.60 One Schmidt was in the business of operating motor vehicles for the carriage of passengers
between Seattle and Portland. He had not procured a certificate
of public convenience and necessity He was, therefore, arrested
at the instance of the Department of Public Works for operating
without a certificate. This suit was brought to restrain the Department from interfering with his business on the ground that it
was purely interstate commerce. The lower court denied injunctive
relief and dismissed the action. On appeal, the decision of the
lower court was affirmed, the court holding that this case was
controlled by its decision in Nortkern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Schoenfeldt.6 '
The case that marks the turning point in state regulation 62
of
interstate carriers by motor vehicle is that of Buck v. Kuykendal.
Buck, a citizen of Washington, wished to operate an auto stage
over the Pacific Highway between Seattle, Wash., and Portland,
Ore., as a common carrier for hire, exclusively for through interstate passengers and express. He obtained the prescribed license
from the state of Oregon. He then applied to the Department of
Public Works of Washington for a certificate of public convenience
and necessity This was refused on the ground that, under the
laws of the state, a certificate may not be granted for any territory
which is already being adequately served by .the holder of a certificate, and that the territory was being adequately served both by
motor and steam transportation. Buck brought suit against Kuykendall, the Director of Public Works, to enjoin the interference
with the operation of his projected line. The lower court denied
the application. The case was then carried to the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, after pointing out some of the types of
state regulation of interstate commerce which may be sustained
under the police power, stated.
The provision here in question is of a different
character. Its primary purpose is not regulation with a
view to safety or to conservation of the highways, but
"

60123 Wash. 705, 213 Pac. 31 (1923).

"See supra note 58. To like effect see the holding of the court in the
following cases: Transit Co. v. Derr, 228 Pac. 624 (1924 Mont.) Re
Engelke, P. U. R. 1922C, 71 (1922 N. Y.) and Chabersburg,G. If W Street
R. Co. v. Hardaman P. U. R. 1921C, 628 (1921 Pa.).
"U. S. 307, 69 L. Ed. 623, 45 Sup. Ct. 324, 38 A. L. R. 286 (1925).
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the prohibition of competition. It determines not the
manner of use, but the persons by whom the highways
may be used.
Thus, the provision of the Washington
statute is a regulation, not of the use of its own highways,
but of interstate commerce. Its effect upon such commerce
is not merely to burden but to obstruct it. Such state action
is forbidden by the commerce clause. It also defeats the
purpose of Congress expressed in the legislation giving
Federal aid 3 for the construction of interstate high-

ways. "64
It seems that the Federal aid legislation was not a material
factor in influencing the decision of the court, for on the same day
the court arrived at the same conclusion in Bush & Sons Co. v.
Maloy,6 51 a similar case in which the question of Federal aid was not
involved. With these decisions, denying a state the right to withhold permission to common carrier auto vehicles for hire to operate
in interstate commerce, the "lid was off." Interstate auto carriers
sprang up all over the country And new problems of regulation
also arose.
In Haselton v Interstate Stage Lines6 6 defendant operated a
daily line of busses over a regular route between Boston, Mass., and
Manchester, N. H., with intervening stops at Lowell, Mass., and
Nashau, N. H. The lower court issued an order enjoining defendant from receiving intrastate passengers until it had complied with
the statute regulating the transportation of passengers for hire
in motor vehicles. Defendant contended that it was an interstate
carrier, immune from state control with respect to its interstate
business, and that its character as an interstate carrier rendered
it immune from state regulation of its intrastate business. The
court, however, affirming the order of the lower court, held that
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution did not grant an
interstate carrier immunity from state control as to its intrastate
13 The part of the Pacific Highway which lies within the
state of Washington was built by it with Federal aid. Ibid 314.

"Ibid 315-316. In Michigan Public Utilities Commzissioiz v. Duke, 266

U. S. 570, 69 L. Ed. 445, 45 Sup. Ct. 191, 36 A. L. R. 105 (1925) the court
had held ihat a statute of the State of Michigan similar to Chapter 111,
Laws of 1921, of the State of Washington, when appli-ed to a private
interstate carrier by motor vehicle, was a violation of the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution, and that the state could not by legislative fiat "conxert property used exclusively in the business of a private
carrier into a public utility" without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. In line with the holding on the latter point see Big Ben4 Auto
Freight v. Ogers, 148 Wash. 521, 269 Pac. 802 (1928)
267 U. S. 317, 69 L. Ed. 627 (1925).
133 Atl. 451, 47 A. L. R. 218 (1926 N. H.)
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business. This is manifestly sound, for to hold otherwise would
practically paralyze state regulation of intrastate commerce.
The city of Seattle passed an ordinance requiring a license of
all drivers of automobiles for hire, and prescribing certain qualifications as prerequisite to the issuance of such license. In Internatsonal Motor Transit Co. v. City of Seattle6 7 the city sought to
enforce this ordinance against the driver of an interstate auto
stage operating between Seattle and Portland. The driver and the
stage company applied for an injunction restraiing the city from
enforcing the ordinance as to them. It was held that the city could
not require the driver of an interstate auto stage to get a license
from it, as this would constitute a burden on interstate commerce
in violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
A case of unusual importance was that of Sprout v. South Bend.6
The city of South Bend, Ind., pursuant to authority, enacted an
ordinance providing that a license fee would have to be paid and
a liability contract of insurance would have to be taken out in an
insurance company authorized to do business under the laws of
the state of Indiana by everyone using the streets or highways of
the city for the indiscriminate solicitation of passengers for transportation from or to a point within the city to or from a point
without the city
Sprout operated a 12-passenger bus between South Bend, Ind.,
and Niles, Mich. (It was about 42 miles from the north city limits
of South Bend to the state line and four or five miles from the
state line north to Niles.) While Sprout would stop the bus to
discharge passengers before reaching the state line, he always insisted that they pay transportation to some point in lichigan.
An action was brought by the city to compel Sprout to obtain
indemnity insurance. From a judgment requiring him to do this
he appealed. The supreme court of the state held that neither the
requirement of an indemity bond nor a license as a condition precedent to doing business in the city streets violated the Federal
Constitution.
The case was carried on writ of error to the Supreme Court of
the United States. 69 That court, Mr. Justice Brandeis delivering
the opinion, stated.
(1) "The legal character of this suburban bus traffic
07141 Wash. 194, 251 Pac. 120 (1926).
153 N. E. 504, 49 A. L. R. 1198 (1926 Ind.).
Sprout v. City of Sout& Bend, Ind., 277 U. S. 163, 72 L. Ed. 833, 48
Sup. Ct. 502, 62 A. L. R. 45 (1928).
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was not affected by the device of requiring the payment
of a fare fixed for some Michigan point, or by Sprout professing that he sought only passengers destined to that
state. The actual facts govern. For this purpose, the destination intended by the passenger when he begins his
journey, and known to the carrier, determines the character of the commerce." 70
(2) In the absence of Federal legislation covering the
subject, the state" may require licensing or registration
of busses used in interstate commerce, and a license fee
no larger in amount than is reasonably required to defray
the expense of administering the regulations may be demanded.
"
But it does not appear that the license fee here
in question was imposed as an incident of such a scheme
of municipal regulation, nor that the proceeds were applied to defray the expenses of such regulation, nor that
the amount collected under the ordinance was no more
than was reasonably required for such a purpose. It follows that the exaction of the license fee can not be sustained as a police measure.
"I'
(3) "A state may impose, even on motor vehicles engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, a reasonable
charge as their fair contribution to the cost of constructing
"
and maintaining the public highways
But it was not found that any part of the license fee here in question had been prescribed for that purpose, so its exaction could not
be sustained either as an inspection fee or as an excise for the
use of the streets of the city
(4) "A state may, by appropriate legislation, require
payment of an occupation tax from one engaged in both
,74
intrastate and interstate commerce
But it may do so only if it is imposed solely on account of the
intrastate business, the amount is not increased because of the
interstate business done, and the person taxed could discontinue
the intrastate business without withdrawing also from the interstate business.
'OIbid. 168. See also Inter-City Coach Co. v. Atwood 21 Fed. (2d) 83
(1927)
,'It was pointed out that the state might delegate the power to a
municipality
12277 U. S. at 169-170.
"Ibid. 170. See also Clark v. Poor 274 U. S. 554, 71 L. Ed. 1199, 47
Sup. Ct. 702 (1927)
and Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276
U. S. 245, 72 L. Ed. 551 (1928) upholding an imposition of a mileage
tax on interstate operators.
74277 U. S. at 170-171.
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(5) A state may require operators of busses engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce to file contracts providing adequate insurance for the payment of judgments
recovered for certain injuries resulting from their operation, "if limited to damages suffered
'75 within the state by
persons other than the passenger."
The court, however, did not pass upon the question whether the
insurance here prescribed was obnoxious to the commerce clause,
for it said the ordinance was void because of the imposition of the
license fee.
The validity of the requirement that interstate motor carriers
provide adequate insurance protection for persons "other than
the passenger," came up in Williams v. Denney.7"
Williams and another were arrested for operating an auto transportation company without a certificate of public convemence and
necessity At the time of the arrest each of them had a sedan car
carrying only a California motor vehicle license. Each was operating and proposed to continue to operate as a common carrier.
They stated that they desired to operate as an auto transportation
company exclusively in interstate service between Seattle and
California, but that they would not file any insurance policy or
bond as required by the Transportation by Motor Vehicles Act.77
They were informed that a certificate would be issued as a matter
of course upon their filing an application, paying the filing fee of
$25 each, and each filing the insurance policy 78 , but that no such
certificates would be issued until such insurance policies were filed.
It was shown that insurance of the character required by the statute could have been secured for $291.
Williams thereupon filed an action to restrain the Director of
Public Works from interfering with their operation as interstate
motor vehicle common carriers between Seattle and California. On
appeal the state supreme court held that the 9tatute requiring liability and indemnity insurance for the protection of persons other
than passengers was a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. 79 The court criticized the limitation placed by the Supreme
"Ibid. 171-172.
" 151 Wash.630, 276 Pac. 858 (1929).
Chapter 111, Laws of 1921, as amended.
"8It was shown that since the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Buck v. Kuykendafl (supra note 65) the Department of
Public Works had issued 62 certificates of public convenience and necessity
to interstate carriers as a matter of right, and all the holders filed the required liability insurance.
19Citing Sprout v. City of South Bend, Ind., supra note 69.
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Court of the United States upon the state to require insurance for
the protection of persons "other than the passenger." The court
said
"Why there should be such distinction we are unable
to perceive. Certainly those being carried through the state
in interstate commerce by such common carriers as those
in question are as greatly affected and as deeply concerned
in the question, whether, if injured by their carrier they
may obtain financial relief, as are those suffering damages 'other than the passenger.' Interstate railway car
riers have property within the state available for the recovery of damages, and such carriers have always been
liable for negligent injury within a state of interstate passengers as well as intrastate passengers, if jurisdiction
could be obtained of such carrier in such state.
"These interstate busses are often comparatively irresponsible financially, frequently incurring liabilities
"80
wholly incomparable to their available assets.
The reason for the distinction may rest in the fact that the passenger is engaged in interstate commerce or transportation and
has deliberately assumed the risk of riding on an irresponsible
carrier, whereas the persons "other than the passenger" have not.
That the present situation with respect to the regulation of
interstate carriers by motor vehicle is most unsatisfactory is
obvious.
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